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Cooperation among non-kin is well documented in humans and widespread in non-human 14 
animals, but explaining the occurrence of cooperation in the absence of inclusive fitness 15 
benefits has proven a significant challenge. Current theoretical explanations converge on a 16 
single point: co-operators can prevail when they cluster in social space. However, we know 17 
very little about the real-world mechanisms that drive such clustering, particularly in systems 18 
where cognitive limitations make it unlikely that mechanisms such as score keeping and 19 
reputation are at play. Here we show that Trinidadian guppies (Poecilia reticulata) use a ‘Walk 20 
Away’ strategy, a simple social heuristic by which assortment by cooperativeness can come 21 
about among mobile agents. Guppies cooperate during predator inspection and we found that 22 
when experiencing defection in this context, individuals prefer to move to a new social 23 
environment, despite having no prior information about this new social group. Our results 24 
provide evidence in non-human animals that individuals use a simple social partner updating 25 
strategy in response to defection, supporting theoretical work applying heuristics to 26 
understanding the proximate mechanisms underpinning the evolution of cooperation among 27 
non-kin.  28 
 29 





The conundrum of cooperation [1, 2], where one individual pays a cost so that another can 33 
receive a benefit, was highlighted by Darwin [3], who realised that individuals that express a 34 
trait (e.g., cooperation) must themselves benefit for the trait to be favoured by natural selection. 35 
Yet cooperation is seen at every level of biological organization (intra cellular to societal) [4] 36 
and across taxonomic groups from microbes to humans [1]. Cooperation becomes particularly 37 
difficult to explain when benefits are conferred upon unrelated individuals and the past three 38 
decades have seen substantial theoretical attention given to identifying pathways by which non-39 
kin cooperation can evolve (e.g. direct reciprocity [5], indirect reciprocity [6], generalised 40 
reciprocity [7-9], network reciprocity [10], group selection [11] and by-product benefits [12]). 41 
The merits of each of these models have been much debated [13-17], but they all have a single 42 
unifying feature: for cooperation to persist, co-operating individuals must cluster together 43 
[reviewed in 18]. Essentially, cooperation can prevail when cooperative individuals interact at 44 
higher rates with each other than with non-cooperative individuals, because this decreases the 45 
exploitation of cooperators by defectors and increases reciprocation of cooperative benefits to 46 
cooperators. Thus clusters of co-operators can gain higher fitness payoffs than defectors in the 47 
population [19, 20]. Identifying the processes that drive the clustering of cooperation in social 48 
landscapes is thus at the heart of unravelling the conundrum of how costly behaviours that 49 
benefit non-kin have evolved [19].  50 
 51 
Theoretical work suggests that heuristics, simple decision-making rules, can underpin social 52 
dynamics (the formation and breaking of social ties) and thereby drive assortment by 53 
cooperation [18, 21-23]. For example, decisions about joining or leaving groups in response to 54 
cooperation or defection can generate social assortment by individual cooperativeness (i.e. 55 
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phenotypic propensity to cooperate) [18, 22-24]. Heuristics incorporate behavioural rules for 56 
making fast and economical decisions when the information available to individuals is 57 
incomplete and the future is uncertain [25]. These conditions for decision making are likely to 58 
be prevalent in systems with noisy, rapidly varying social environments and where decision 59 
making is not supported by advanced cognitive abilities; conditions which typify many non-60 
human social animals. Currently however, it is unclear whether heuristics have a role to play 61 
in driving the dynamical linking of social ties in non-human animals in the context of 62 
cooperation. This represents a key gap in understanding cooperation, as characterizing the 63 
behavioural rules that govern dynamical linking is fundamental to determining the mechanisms 64 
that drive the clustering of co-operators [26]. Here we probe the social heuristics that underpin 65 
the formation and breaking of social ties in the context of cooperation in Trinidadian guppies 66 
(Poecilia reticulata).  67 
 68 
Trinidadian guppies live in dynamic fission-fusion societies where individuals cooperate with 69 
non-kin during predator inspection [27] and where there is evidence of social assortment by 70 
cooperative tendency [28]. During predator inspection in fish, one or more individuals will 71 
leave the shoal to approach the predator closely and gain information about the level of threat 72 
posed by the predator [29]; information that benefits all members of the group [30]. Work in 73 
guppies and other fish species has demonstrated that inspectors pay a personal cost of increased 74 
risk of predation [31, 32], which they can reduce by inspecting in cooperative partnerships [33-75 
35]. There has been much debate on the mechanisms maintaining cooperation during predator 76 
inspection, with some evidence suggesting a ‘TIT-for-TAT’ strategy is used [36]. In this 77 
strategy, individuals initially cooperate with a partner and in future, repeated iterations with 78 
this same partner, copy the partner’s last move (i.e. either cooperate or defect) [36]. Given the 79 
highly dynamic nature of daily social interactions however, and the large number of individuals 80 
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that make up each individual’s social environment [37, 38], guppies are also likely to rely on 81 
simple behavioural mechanisms of assortment that will allow them to avoid having to process 82 
and store the high volumes and rates of social information that they are exposed to. Guppies 83 
therefore constitute a potentially powerful model system for a new avenue of empirical work 84 
to test for key assortment mechanisms proposed by theoretical models to underpin the evolution 85 
of cooperation among unrelated individuals.  86 
 87 
We aimed to test whether individuals use a simple behavioural strategy - 'leave in the face of 88 
defection' requiring only limited information on the behavioural tendencies of others. Models 89 
by Aktipis [18, 22] and Schuessler [24] show that such simple heuristics can generate 90 
assortment among cooperative mobile agents. Under a ‘Walk Away’ conditional movement 91 
strategy, individuals break away from defecting social partners [18, 22-24] and join a new 92 
partner or group upon encounter, without information on the behavioural tendencies of the 93 
partner or group [18, 22]. The conceptual attraction of the ‘Walk Away’ heuristic for generating 94 
positive assortment of cooperative phenotypes in real-world populations is that it avoids 95 
cognitively demanding bookkeeping. That is, it does not require committing to memory the 96 
identity of social partners, or indeed their behaviour over multiple iterations, to aid in making 97 
decisions to associate with a partner (or partners). This is in contrast to the TIT-for-TAT 98 
strategy, which requires remembering the last actions of specific partners (i.e. partner 99 
behaviour and identity). The strategy also differs from other exit strategies such as the well-100 
known ‘win-stay, lose-shift’, where an actor continues or “stays” with an action – cooperate or 101 
defect - unless the gain no longer meets some threshold and then switches or “shifts” to the 102 
opposing action - cooperate or defect in an iterated game [39]. Like with a  ‘TIT-for-TAT’ 103 
strategy, an individual thus changes their own cooperativeness as a reaction to that of others 104 
[although for an approach that models ‘win-stay, lose-shift’ with ‘shift’ including an option to 105 
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leave the group see 23]. In contrast, in the ‘Walk Away’ strategy individuals in effect change 106 
their social environment without any prescription for who to join or how to behave (cooperate 107 
or defect) in any subsequent round or game [18, 22, 24]. That is, with a ‘Walk Away’ strategy, 108 
individuals do not need to be able to exhibit plasticity in their own cooperative behaviour, 109 
further contributing to its simplicity and, importantly, possible traits under selection [e.g., 40, 110 
41-43]. 111 
  112 
‘Walk Away’ models for the evolution of cooperation were originally formulated for 113 
populations with fairly stable group structures [18, 22, 24]. However, populations of social 114 
animals typically live in societies with fission-fusion dynamics, such as those experienced by 115 
Trinidadian guppies. It is not immediately clear that under these conditions, a ‘Walk Away’ 116 
strategy can allow positive assortment of cooperation to emerge against the background 117 
merging and splitting of groups, which in this and other systems is driven by myriad factors 118 
[44]. We have therefore confirmed that a ‘Walk Away’ social heuristic can generate assortment 119 
by cooperation in populations with fission-fusion dynamics similar to those in guppies using 120 
an agent-based simulation model to further support the rationale for the current study (see 121 
supplementary materials). To test the hypothesis that guppies will use a ‘Walk Away’ strategy, 122 
we exposed individuals to unfamiliar social partners, manipulated their perception of these 123 
partners’ cooperative behaviour during a predator inspection event and then monitored the 124 
propensity for individuals to change their social environment following their ostensible 125 
experience of cooperation or defection. We predicted that if a ‘Walk Away’ strategy exists in 126 
this species, individuals would prefer to associate with novel social partners over social 127 





Study animals 131 
We used laboratory reared adult female Trinidadian guppies descended from wild fish collected 132 
in the lower reaches of the Aripo River (10°40’ N 61° 14’ W) on the island of Trinidad, a site 133 
where adult guppies experience a high risk of predation from piscivorous fish. Focal fish were 134 
housed in groups of 10 in 29 x 19 x 17 cm aquaria. Stimulus fish were housed in groups of 100 135 
in 80 x 30 x 39 cm aquaria. Focal and stimulus fish were randomly selected from stocks of fish 136 
housed under naturalistic conditions in four physically isolated pools (approximately 2000 fish 137 
per pool). All fish were fed twice daily to satiation on their specified diet (stimulus fish diets 138 
are explained below; focal fish were fed on a diet of tropical fish flake and brine shrimp, 139 
Artemia sp.). The study was carried out under UK Home Office Licence PIL 30/8944, reviewed 140 
by the University of Exeter Animal Welfare and Ethical Review Body, and in strict accordance 141 
with the UK Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. To minimize stress, all fish used in the 142 
study were provided with plant refugia and always had, at a minimum, visual access to social 143 
partners, with the exception of our control experiment where focal fish were without contact to 144 
social partners during testing. Power analysis after an initial data collection phase (N=6 145 
replicates per cell) was used to ensure that we used the smallest number of animals possible 146 
while maintaining high test power (16 replicates per cell, SPSS SamplePower 21 v. 3.0.1, IBM 147 
SPSS Inc.).  148 
 149 
Experimental apparatus and procedure 150 
 151 
Study design 152 
 153 
To test for the existence of a ‘Walk Away’ strategy in Trinidadian guppies, we experimentally 154 
exposed 136 female guppies to a cooperative or non-cooperative social environment and 155 
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subsequently tested their social preference for ostensibly the same social environment versus a 156 
novel one. 157 
 158 
Predator inspection 159 
 160 
Inspection arenas were similar to those used in other studies involving predator inspection in 161 
guppies (e.g., [28, 45, 46]). Aquaria (80 x 30 cm) were sub-divided with Perspex partitions to 162 
produce two inspection lanes and two predator enclosures (Fig. 1A). A guide system was in 163 
place between the predator enclosures and the inspection lanes where a removable opaque 164 
partition was positioned to visually isolate the predator enclosure from focal fish prior to the 165 
start of a trial. Predator enclosures were either empty or contained a single predatory fish 166 
(Aequidens pulcher) depending on condition (see below). A refuge was located at the end 167 
opposite to the predator enclosures with an artificial plant and a perforated transparent 168 
rectangular stimulus shoal compartment (10 x 4.5 x 18 cm). The inside of each inspection lane 169 
was lined with a reversible partition that had a mirror on one side and a uniform, light grey 170 
surface on the other side. With this design, in a mirrored lane an inspecting fish was ostensibly 171 
joined by a fish from the compartment of social partners (i.e. the stimulus shoal) in the form of 172 
its mirrored reflection, and in a non-mirrored lane also connected to a compartment of 173 
physically constrained social partners an inspecting fish ostensibly experienced defection from 174 
these partners (Fig. 1A). This experimental paradigm built on protocols used in previous studies 175 
[reviewed in 47], and recent work has illustrated that using a mirror stimulus in a predator 176 
inspection context elicits behaviour in a focal fish that aligns with its behaviour with a live 177 
partner [28]. The water depth in each subsection of an arena was 11 cm. Arenas were 178 
illuminated with full spectrum 40W bulbs and filmed from above using Samsung digital colour 179 




Thirty minutes before the onset of each trial, predator naïve stimulus shoals were placed in the 182 
stimulus shoal compartments of each inspection lane. Each stimulus shoal consisted of four 183 
size-matched, predator-naïve female guppies that the focal fish had not previously encountered. 184 
We manipulated identity cues of the stimulus shoals by feeding them on one of two diets (larval 185 
Chironominae sp. or adult Daphnia sp.) that were novel to the focal fish, for min. 7 days and 186 
up to 14 days prior to the trials. Guppies use odour cues for social decision making [48] and 187 
this method allowed us to generate distinct novel odour cues for groups of fish. Stimulus shoal 188 
compartment walls were perforated to allow odour cues to diffuse across the compartment 189 
barrier. During their inspection of the predator (Fig. 1A) focal fish could thus become familiar 190 
with global (shoal level) odour cues of social partners originating from their diet in tandem 191 
with experiencing either defection or cooperation, depending on treatment.  192 
 193 
At the start of a trial, individual focal fish were released into the centre of an inspection lane 194 
and allowed 10 minutes to acclimatize. During this period the opaque partition between the 195 
predator enclosures and the inspection lanes remained in place. Focal individuals were then 196 
gently encouraged into the refuge area next to the confined stimulus shoal using a dip net. The 197 
opaque partition between the predator enclosures and inspection lanes was then lifted. In 198 
experimental test trials the lifting of the barrier revealed a live predator and in control trials, 199 
intended to account for possible effects inherent to the experimental setup, an empty enclosure. 200 
Inspection occurred when fish left the refuge area and swam towards the predator enclosure. 201 
Mirrored lanes simulated cooperation by a member of the stimulus shoal, while non-mirrored 202 
lanes simulated defection by all members of the shoal. Trials ended after a 5-minute inspection 203 
period and focal fish were immediately removed from the inspection lane and transferred in a 204 
small container of water into a binary choice tank for the social partner choice test (see below). 205 
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At the end of a trial all stimulus fish were removed and a complete water change of the arena 206 
was carried out. 207 
 208 
Social partner choice test 209 
 210 
Immediately following the predator inspection trial, focal individuals were transferred to a 211 
binary shoal choice arena and tested for their association preferences for social partners fed 212 
either on the same diet as experienced in the predator inspection trial (i.e. Chironominae sp. or 213 
Daphnia sp. fed fish) or the unfamiliar (novel) diet. Arenas (45 x 30 cm, water depth 11cm) 214 
were sub-divided into three compartments using perforated Perspex barriers similar to [49]. 215 
Two stimulus shoal compartments at opposite ends of the arena measured 7.5 x 30 cm, which 216 
left a middle compartment for the focal fish that measured 30 x 30 cm. Arenas were illuminated 217 
and filmed as above. Forty-five minutes prior to the onset of a trial a shoal of 5 fish was placed 218 
in each stimulus shoal compartment of the choice arena (matched for body size across shoals). 219 
One compartment contained fish on the Daphnia sp. diet and the other contained fish on the 220 
bloodworm diet. Each focal fish was thus presented with one stimulus shoal composed of fish 221 
on the same diet as the fish they had experienced in the inspection trial and another composed 222 
of fish on the second novel diet, to which the focal was naive. All stimulus fish were predator 223 
naïve and had not been used in the predator exposure treatment. This design was used because 224 
the experiences of the stimulus fish during the inspection trials could potentially lead to 225 
differential behaviour between the two shoals during the choice trial if they were used there as 226 
well. Using odours as identity cues allowed us to avoid this potentially confounding factor. At 227 
the start of a choice trial, focal fish that had just been removed from an inspection trial were 228 
placed in the centre of the arena and given 5 minutes to acclimatize. After acclimatization, we 229 
recorded the time that focals spent shoaling with each stimulus shoal over a 10-minute period. 230 
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Focal fish were recorded as shoaling with stimulus fish if they were within 5 cm of the barrier 231 
to a shoal compartment (preference zone; based on the elective group size concept [50]). At 232 
the end of the trial all fish were removed from the arena and a complete water change was 233 
carried out. 234 
 235 
Analysis of behavioural data 236 
 237 
Our analysis is based on 129 focal fish that entered the preference zone of both shoals at least 238 
once during the shoal choice trial (7 fish did not visit both sides; Supplementary material Table 239 
S1).  The inspection and shoaling behaviour of each focal fish was scored manually using the 240 
Observer XT v. 10.1 by a single observer (SKD) blind to the condition and treatment that focal 241 
fish were in. For inspection trials we quantified the average distance of focal fish to the predator 242 
enclosure over the 5-minute inspection period. For shoal choice trials we calculated the 243 
proportion of shoaling time that focal fish spent with each of the two shoals which were angular 244 
transformed prior to statistical analysis as per convention for analysing proportional data in this 245 
way [51]. 246 
 247 
We used a general linear model (GLM) to test for effects of our experimental manipulations 248 
on the social partner choices made by our focal fish. In the model we used the angular 249 
transformed proportion of time spent with the novel (unfamiliar odour) shoal during the binary 250 
shoal choice trial as the dependent variable, and condition (2 levels: control and experimental), 251 
social experience (2 levels: defection and cooperation) and stimulus shoal diet encountered 252 
during inspection (2 levels: Daphnia and bloodworm) as fixed effects..Our initial model 253 
contained the inspection behaviour of our focal fish as a covariate, however it had no effect 254 
(F1,116=0.393; p=0.532, see Supplementary materials Table S2)) and was removed from the 255 
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final model. We explored a significant interaction between condition and treatment using post 256 
hoc one-sample t-tests with a Bonferroni corrected α level of 0.0125.  257 
 258 
Methods of non-social control experiment 259 
 260 
We ran a non-social control experiment that used a modified version of the main experimental 261 
paradigm in order to investigate whether any effects found in the main experiment could 262 
alternatively be explained by the guppies connecting their experience (cooperation/defection) 263 
with the odour cues themselves, rather than with the social environments associated with those 264 
odour cues. That is, effects found in the main experiment could potentially be explained by a 265 
mechanism that caused focal individuals to, for example, avoid an odour that they associated 266 
with high predation risk in the defection condition (approaching a predator as a singleton). In 267 
this control experiment, the overall design was the same as in the main experiment (inspection 268 
then shoal choice) and odour cues derived from the same diets were used (Chironominae sp. 269 
and Daphnia sp.; see below)), but no social cues (no stimulus shoal and no mirror) were 270 
provided in the inspection trials. In the subsequent shoal choice test, focal individuals could 271 
choose between two shoals of fish, each of which was paired with one of the two odours. 272 
 273 
Odour cues in this experiment were introduced in the form of odour water. This was created 274 
by masticating frozen daphnia or bloodworm (Daphnia sp., and Chironominae sp., i.e. the same 275 
diet odours as in the main experiment) in water (5 g of daphnia and 2.6 g of bloodworm per 276 
300 ml water) and filtering the mixture through a fine sieve in order to remove macroscopic 277 
particles. The odour water was introduced into the predator inspection lane at the refuge end, 278 
where the stimulus shoal was placed in the main experiment (opposite to the predator stimulus 279 
end), via a plastic tube connected to a funnel placed over the tank. The rate at which the odour 280 
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water entered the tank was controlled by a flowmeter (MMA-35, Dwyer Instruments, Michigan 281 
City, IN, USA) set to 25 ml/min. 500ml odour water was placed in the funnel prior to the trial 282 
and the flowmeter was opened at the beginning of the trial. The trial otherwise proceeded as in 283 
the main experiment (as per above in a ‘no mirror’ condition only). The subsequent binary 284 
shoal choice tests were also similar to the ones in the main experiment; except that the stimulus 285 
shoals each consisted of four females that had not been fed with the diets used to create odours. 286 
Instead, odour water (200 ml) with the two experimental odours was introduced into each shoal 287 
compartment prior to the test trial, one odour in each compartment. The experimental tanks 288 
were thoroughly cleaned after each trial to remove any odour remains. We used a one-sample 289 
t-test to test for a preference for shoals paired with the novel odour, taken as the angular 290 




We found that the presence or absence of a predator during the inspection portion of a trial (i.e. 295 
inspection condition: experimental or control) interacted with having partners that either 296 
cooperated or defected during the inspection (i.e. social experience: cooperation or defection) 297 
to influence subsequent shoal choice (Table 1). Post hoc analysis revealed that individuals 298 
experiencing a defecting social environment preferred partners with an unfamiliar odour over 299 
partners with a familiar odour when given a subsequent choice (Fig. 1B), which was not the 300 
case for control treatments (no predator) or our experimental cooperation treatment, where we 301 
did not find any preferences (Table 2, Bonferroni corrected α=0.0125). 302 
 303 
If the significant preference found in the main experiment was based on avoidance of the odour 304 
associated with inspecting a predator as a singleton, rather than avoidance of the social 305 
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environment associated with the predator inspection experience, then a preference for a shoal 306 
bearing a novel odour (as opposed to that experienced during inspection), should also be 307 
present in the non-social control experiment. However, in this control experiment we found 308 
that focal fish did not show a preference for fish associated with the novel odour (back-309 
transformed mean proportion of time spent with novel odour fish+/-SE=0.448+0.0406/-0.0403; 310 




We found that female Trinidadian guppies experiencing a social environment where all others 315 
defected during predator inspection, preferred novel partners (that they had no prior 316 
information on) over ostensibly familiar social partners in a subsequent social choice test. This 317 
result demonstrates that individuals actively sever ties with defecting social partners and seek 318 
out links with others, even when they do not have information on the cooperative behaviour of 319 
these novel social partners; both are consistent with a ‘Walk Away’ strategy [18, 22, 24]. To 320 
our knowledge this is the first empirical evidence for the existence of this social heuristic in a 321 
non-human animal system.  322 
 323 
In humans the option to leave a defecting partner, ‘opting out’, has been shown both 324 
theoretically and empirically to allow cooperation to prevail [52-56] and empirical work 325 
suggests that something akin to conditional movement strategies is active in humans. For 326 
example, dynamic partner updating under conditions of limited information has been 327 
demonstrated experimentally in response to low levels of cooperative behaviour in partners 328 
[40, 52, 54, 55, 57]. Indeed, one study has shown that when constrained to a set behavioural 329 
repertoire of either staying with an interaction partner or joining another, randomly assigned, 330 
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partner between rounds of a cooperative game, movement (‘link-breaking’) decisions generate 331 
assortment of cooperative behaviour across a network of interaction partners [40]. It is 332 
important to note that in the majority of paradigms in these empirical studies with humans, 333 
participants operate with partner-specific information that goes beyond what is outlined for a 334 
‘Walk Away’ strategy, so that ties are preferentially broken with defectors and new ties are 335 
preferentially made with co-operators [e.g., 52, 57] or individuals are able to log the behaviour 336 
of specific individuals and use this knowledge in subsequent encounters with those individuals 337 
[40]. Still, at the core of these paradigms, having knowledge of and control over the option to 338 
leave is critical in determining the economic decisions made by players [52, 54, 55, 58, 59], 339 
even when the assignment of a new partner is made at random [54, 55, 59]. Our study provides 340 
evidence of the existence of this class of strategies outside of humans and supports its simplest 341 
use, with individuals making social association choices when they have no information on the 342 
value of future partners. The simplicity of this strategy means that it may be widespread in 343 
natural systems [60]. Furthermore, future work examining the heritability of the ‘Walk Away’ 344 
strategy and how it has been shaped by natural selection would provide valuable insights into 345 
the evolution of cooperation in natural populations. 346 
 347 
Although our findings highlight a mechanism thay may go some way to explaining the 348 
persistence of non-kin cooperation in guppy populations, they do not preclude other 349 
mechanisms that may be working simultaneously in this species; such as choosing specific 350 
partners based on immediate observation of their cooperative tendency [e.g., 61, but see below] 351 
or conditional cooperative behaviour based on the cooperative behaviour of current social 352 
partners [10, 62-64]. For example, generalized reciprocity (or ‘help anyone if helped by 353 
someone’), has been demonstrated with computer modelling to generate positive assortment of 354 
cooperative interactions via cooperative responses conditional to experience [65]. Support for 355 
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cooperation via generalized reciprocity is based on experiences of cooperative behaviour that 356 
is wholly anonymous (i.e. identification of the actor is not necessary), and thus may be 357 
particularly relevant for the guppy system [23,65-66]. Future work exploring if other social 358 
heuristics are used in combination with a ‘Walk Away’ strategy to support cooperation in 359 
guppies is eagerly anticipated. 360 
 361 
In our experiment, in addition to guppies ‘walking away’ from defecting partners it could also 362 
be expected that they would prefer the social environment where they had experienced 363 
cooperation. Both of these would work toward driving the positive assortment by cooperative 364 
propensity [reviewed in 67 and see Supplementary materials Section 1] that we have seen 365 
evidence for in wild guppy populations [28]. We did not, however, find clear evidence that our 366 
focal individuals preferred partners that had cooperated during predator inspection over 367 
partners for whom they had no information on their propensity to cooperate. Previous evidence 368 
from this study system indeed suggests that individuals have a preference for a more 369 
cooperative over a less cooperative partner when given a choice between the two [61]. . 370 
However, a key paradigm difference between the experiment presented here and this previous 371 
work [61] is that individuals were able to choose from social partners for whom they had 372 
complete information; that is, they had knowledge of the cooperative propensity of each 373 
potential partner in a binary choice test. This means that although fish may have been actively 374 
choosing the more cooperative partner, they may alternatively have been actively choosing to 375 
leave the defecting partner as in our study.  In support of this latter explanation, we can consider 376 
evidence from work in humans suggesting a higher propensity to remember traits or 377 
experiences associated with defectors compared to cooperators [68]. In humans this effect 378 
appears to be linked to the importance of the information in predicting trait characteristics of 379 
individuals and thus the outcome of future interactions [69, 70]. In this case, a negativity bias 380 
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can exist when ‘negative’ cues are more diagnostic than ‘positive’ cues [70]. With a ‘Walk 381 
Away’ heuristic, the important diagnostic information regarding the behaviour of an unfamiliar 382 
social group is whether they defect during predator inspection, as opposed to whether they 383 
cooperate, as this is what drives the decision to leave. It could be that the underlying premise 384 
for this strategy is a negativity bias, particularly when an entire group of individuals defects 385 
compared to when just one individual from a group cooperates (i.e. the diagnostic value of the 386 
‘positive’ information is low). An increased propensity to remember social partners from a 387 
situation where they defected, but not where they cooperated, and then acting on this 388 
information for subsequent social association decisions, thus seem like plausible explanations 389 
for the updating behaviour and lack of preference for cooperative shoals that we observed.  390 
 391 
Theoretical work over the last decade has striven to identify simple behavioural mechanisms 392 
that can maintain cooperation among non-kin [most recently reviewed in 63, 67, 71], with 393 
social heuristics likely being important drivers in systems with high levels of social mixing 394 
[e.g., 72]. In our experimental design, individuals did not have the opportunity to use individual 395 
recognition or other information when making partner choices. The work we present thus truly 396 
represents evidence of a real-world heuristic for dynamical linking of social ties in non-human 397 
animals. It most closely resembles a ‘Walk Away’ heuristic, which can generate positive social 398 
assortment by cooperative behaviour in populations of mobile agents ([18] and see 399 
Supplementary materials Section 1). The simplicity of this strategy means that it may be a 400 
general mechanism contributing to the maintenance of cooperation across a broad range of taxa 401 
where individuals can detect non-cooperative behaviour, but where more complex processes 402 
involving, for example, intent and knowledge attribution or bookkeeping of behaviour [73-76], 403 
are not necessarily present. We look forward to further developments in this area. 404 
  405 
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Figure legend 646 
 647 
Figure 1. (A) Predator inspection arena with illustrative examples of movement of fish in 648 
inspection lanes (red lines) (B) When focal fish had experienced defection by a shoal during 649 
predator inspection they differed from other groups in a social partner choice paradigm. They 650 
showed a preference for novel social partners over social partners that were ostensibly from 651 
the shoal they had experienced while inspecting a predator (control = condition with no 652 
predator present; **=significant at α=0.0125; error bars=±1 SEM).  653 
 654 
  655 
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Table 1. Results of the analysis of the main experiment testing for an effect of the inspection 656 
condition that fish were in (no predator present, i.e. control, versus predator present, i.e. 657 
experimental), the social environment that fish experienced during the inspection portion of a 658 
trial (cooperative vs. non-cooperative), the type of diet (daphnia or bloodworm) that novel 659 
shoaling partners had been fed on and their interactions. The significant interaction between 660 
inspection condition and social experience was further explored (Table 2). The significant 661 
effect of diet type was driven by an overall preference for fish that had been fed on a bloodworm 662 
diet.  663 
Source F(1,121) p 
Inspection condition 0.294 0.589 
Social experience 5.491 0.021 
Diet type 4.549 0.035 
Inspection condition * Social experience 6.134 0.015 
Inspection condition * Diet type 0.000 0.984 
Social experience * Diet type 2.840 0.095 
Inspection condition * Social experience * Diet type 0.062 0.804 
 664 
 665 
  666 
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Table 2.  Results of the post hoc t-tests of significant interaction terms in the behavioural 667 
dataset (see Table 1). Significance after Bonferroni-correction (α=0.0125) is shown in bold 668 
and indicates a preference in the shoal-choice experiment for a novel social environment after 669 




experience t df p 
No predator 
present 




0.353 32 0.726 
Predator 
present 
Cooperation -1.675 32 0.104 
  Defection 2.933 32 0.006 
 671 
  672 
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 680 
Section 1: Evidencing that a ‘Walk Away’ social heuristic can lead to assortment of 681 
cooperative agents in a population with fission-fusion group dynamics  682 
Social structures based around dynamic group membership are ubiquitous within the animal 683 
kingdom [1, 2]. Since previous models investigating the extent to which a ‘Walk Away’ rule 684 
can drive positive assortment by propensity to cooperate have not captured these social 685 
dynamics [3-5, but see 6 where individuals can leave a group prior to any interaction], it is 686 
unclear if a ‘Walk Away’ rule can generate such assortment in systems where groups 687 
stochastically split and merge (i.e. the dynamic fission and fusion of groups typifying many 688 
social species). We therefore use a simulation model to explore the proposition that a ‘Walk 689 
Away’ heuristic can generate positive assortment of social interactions by individual 690 
cooperative phenotypes in the highly dynamic social environments that typify many social 691 
vertebrates. 692 
 693 
We implemented an agent-based, steady-state stochastic simulation model of fission and fusion 694 
in the spirit of existing merge and split models [7, 8] to generate conditions representing a 695 
highly dynamic fission-fusion system (see detailed methods below). Our key addition was that 696 
the phenotypes of the group members (45 obligate co-operators and 45 obligate defectors, each 697 
with a given tolerance for defection, Ei) played a part in determining the membership of 698 
daughter groups after fission. Briefly, in our model, we associated each fission event of a parent 699 
group with a public-goods game, yielding a return R for each group member. An individual’s 700 
satisfaction at the outcome of the game was Si=R-Eii, where Ei is the individual’s ‘tolerance’ 701 
for defection (see detailed methods below). Satisfied agents (Si ≥ 0) joined either of two 702 
daughter groups with equal probability. Dissatisfied agents (Si < 0) could ‘Walk Away’, either 703 
by forming a new group of their own, or by joining any one of the other groups in the 704 
population, including the two daughter groups (Fig. S1A,B). From the simulation we collected 705 
2500 independent censuses (every 10,000 timesteps) of group membership to form a weighted 706 
network of associations (see detailed methods below). As a control, we ran a neutral model 707 
where we randomised the membership of the groups recorded in each census in the ‘Walk 708 





Fig S1.  Simulation model ‘Walk Away’ rule implementation with illustrative graphical output. 712 
(A-B) Individual conditional movement decisions made at group fission when a ‘Walk Away’ rule is 713 
imposed on an agent-based, steady-state simulation model with fission–fusion dynamics. (A) ‘Satisfied’ 714 
individuals are those whose minimum return from being in the group is met (R-Ei>0, see text), while 715 
(B) ‘unsatisfied’ individuals are those whose minimum have not been met (R-Ei<0). (C-F) Graphs of 716 
interactions between agents in the model whose association indices are greater than (C-D) 0.042 and 717 
(E-F) 0.06 with (C,E) a ‘Walk Away’ rule imposed and (D,F) a neutral model. Node colour indicates 718 
phenotype (green=co-operator, blue=defector), node size indicates, E, as higher (smaller nodes due to 719 
lower E) and lower (larger nodes due to higher E) tolerance for defection (range 0.2-0.8), lines indicate 720 
dyadic connections greater than the respective filtering thresholds. 721 
 722 
The results of the model demonstrate that even against a dynamic background of fission and 723 
fusion, a simple ‘Walk Away’ rule can drive social assortment by cooperative phenotype (Fig. 724 
S1C,E and Fig. S2); when agents use a walk away strategy, the assortment of social ties by 725 
cooperative phenotype within the population become significantly greater than zero with 726 
increasing tie strength, which is not the case in a neutral model (Figs. S1D,F, S2A and S3).  727 
 728 
Detailed methods 729 
Agent-based simulation model 730 
The model population consisted of 90 agents, 45 obligate co-operators and 45 obligate 731 
defectors. Agents were in groups, whose size and composition were subject to fission-fusion 732 
dynamics implemented through probabilistic rules. At each timestep there was a small 733 
probability (3.5x10-5√(s1s2)) that two groups of size s1 and s2 would fuse to form a group of 734 
size s1+s2; thus large groups were more likely to fuse than were small groups. There was also 735 
a small constant probability (0.004, irrespective of size) that a given group would split and 736 
decision rules were implemented at these fission events. Our split and merge rules allowed us 737 
to mimic a biologically realistic monotonically decreasing group size as typically observed in 738 
fission fusion social systems [9].  739 
 740 
Each agent was assigned a phenotype along a gradient of values, spread evenly in the range 0.2 741 
to 0.8, that determined its “expectation”, Ei, of the cooperative behaviour of others in the group. 742 
For example, the lowest E-values (0.2 to 0.4) had lower expectations and therefore can be 743 
34 
 
considered more ‘tolerant’ of defection. At the moment of fission we assumed that the focal 744 
group had just undergone a cooperative game. Each co-operator in the group contributed 1 745 
point to a shared “pool”, defectors contributed 0. The value of the pool was multiplied by 1.9 746 
[as in 3, 4], then shared equally among all group members. This “return” from the game, R, 747 
minus an agent’s expectation Ei, determined its ‘satisfaction’ with being in the group at the 748 
time of the fission event: Si=R-Ei. The satisfied agents (those with Si≥0) split into two daughter 749 
groups (Fig. S1). Each satisfied agent had a 50% chance of being placed in each of the two 750 
groups. Agents that were not satisfied (Si<0) had a tendency to ‘walk away’; they either formed 751 
a group of N=1 or joined an existing group with equal likelihood of joining any particular 752 
group, including each of the daughter groups formed by the fission of satisfied agents (Fig. 753 
S1). After 50,000 timesteps at which point the model had reached steady-state (dynamic 754 
equilibrium), we monitored group membership every 10,000 timesteps, in a series of 2,500 755 
censuses of the population. The 10,000 timestep interval was derived from our expectation in 756 
the neutral model that every agent had had the opportunity to be in a group with every other 757 
agent over that period, which allowed us to produce censuses free of sequential correlation. For 758 
these associations we constructed a weighted 90x90 association  759 
 760 
 761 
Fig S2. Assortment by cooperativeness in the social networks sampled from an agent-based, 762 
steady-state simulation model with fission–fusion dynamics. (A) The assortivity coefficient, r, is an 763 
indicator of the overall assortivity of associations in the population by cooperative phenotype (see 764 
Methods) with a ‘Walk Away’ rule imposed (green) and without such a rule (blue). T is the threshold 765 
over which agents must associate to be assigned a tie strength of one in a binary association matrix. 766 
Error bars = +/- 1𝜎 and indicate whether the value of r differs from zero at a given T (see Methods). (B) 767 
The fraction of ties, ρ, that have an association index greater than our filtering threshold, T, in our ‘Walk 768 
Away’ and neutral models. The decrease reflects the fact that a smaller fraction of the population had 769 






Fig. S3. Frequency of tie ‘types’ in the sampled networks. (A-C) The proportion of edges in the 773 
network, e, that are represented by the three phenotypic dyad types (C,C = co-operator-co-operator, C,D 774 
= co-operator-defector, D,D = defector-defector) with the ‘Walk Away’ rule implemented (green) and 775 
in the null model (blue). 776 
 777 
matrix W, whose entry Wij was the fraction of censuses in which agents i and j were in the 778 
same group. All agents occurred at least once with all others, so all Wij>0. Our neutral model 779 
used the same group sizes as the original model at every census, but the groups were populated 780 
randomly with respect to S. 781 
 782 
Analysis of simulation data 783 
To analyse whether the implementation of a ‘Walk Away’ rule was sufficient to maintain long-784 






series of binary matrices A(T) whose entry Aij(T) was 1 if Wij≥T, and 0 otherwise. T is a 786 
threshold fraction of times agents were found in the same group in our 2,500 censuses. As T 787 
increased, the density of A (ρ , the fraction of elements that are 1) decreased reflecting the fact 788 
strong associations were found between a smaller fraction of agents (Fig. S1). For each A(T), 789 
we computed Newman’s assortativity coefficient r [10] which measures whether there are more 790 
CC and/or DD pairs in our groups than if edges were wired at random (Fig. S2). This is our 791 
measure of assortment in the population. A jack-knife procedure was used to test whether the 792 
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Section 2: Supplementary detail on methods and results of the main experiment. 823 
 824 
Table S1.  Number of focal individuals tested at each level in the study’s main experiment. N 825 











Cooperation Bloodworm 14 
  Daphnia sp. 16 
  Total 30 
 Defection Bloodworm 16 
  Daphnia sp. 17 
  Total 33 
 Total Bloodworm 30 
 
 
Daphnia sp. 33 
  Total 63 
Predator 
present 
Cooperation Bloodworm 16 
  Daphnia sp. 17 
  Total 33 
 Defection Bloodworm 16 
  Daphnia sp. 17 
  Total 33 
 Total Bloodworm 32 
 
 




Total Cooperation Bloodworm 30 
  
Daphnia sp. 33 
  Total 63 
 
Defection Bloodworm 32 
  
Daphnia sp. 34 
  Total 66 
 Total Bloodworm 62 
 
 
Daphnia sp. 67 
    Total 129 
 828 
 829 




Table S2. Results of the analysis of the main experiment testing for an effect of the inspection 831 
condition that fish were in (no predator present, i.e. control, versus predator present, i.e. 832 
experimental), the social environment that fish experienced during the inspection portion of a 833 
trial (cooperative vs. non-cooperative), the type of diet (daphnia or bloodworm) that novel 834 
shoaling partners had been fed on and their interactions including the inspection behaviour of 835 
focal individuals in the model (removed in final model). Note: we did not have inspection data 836 
for 4 focal individuals in the control inspection condition (no predator present) due to video 837 
failures. 838 
 839 
Source F(1,116) p 
Inspection behaviour 0.393 0.532 
Inspection condition 0.749 0.388 
Social experience 5.915 0.017 
Diet type 5.171 0.025 
Inspection condition * Social experience 5.714 0.018 
Inspection condition * Diet type 0.015 0.903 
Social experience * Diet type 2.517 0.115 
Inspection condition * Social experience * Diet type 0.116 0.734 
 840 
 841 
 842 
 843 
